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Abstract
Belief revision and belief update have been proposed as two types of belief change serving
different purposes, revision intended to capture changes in belief state reﬂecting new information
about a static world, and update intended to capture changes of belief in response to a changing
world. We argue that routinebelief change involveselements of both and present a model of gen-
eralized update that allows updates in response to external changes to inform an agent about its
prior beliefs. This model of update combines aspects of revision and update, providing a more
realistic characterization of belief change. We show that, under certain assumptions, the original
update postulates are satisﬁed. We also demonstrate that plain revision and plain update are spe-
cial cases of our model. We also draw parallels to models of stochastic dynamical systems, and
use this to develop a model that deals with iterated update and noisy observations in (qualitative
settings) that is analogous to Bayesian updatingin a quantitativesetting.
￿Some parts of this report appeared in preliminary form in “Generalized Update: Belief Change in Dynamic Settings,”
Proc. of FourteenthInternational Joint Conf. on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI-95), Montreal, pp.1550–1556(1995).
11 Introduction
An underlying premise in much work addressing the design of intelligent agents or programs is that
such agents should (either implicitly or explicitly)hold beliefs about the true state of the world. Typ-
ically, these beliefs are incomplete, for there is much an agent will not know about its environment.
In realistic settings one must also expect an agent’s beliefs to be incorrect from time to time. If an
agent is in a position to make observations and detect such errors, a mechanism is required whereby
the agent can change its beliefs to incorporate new information. Finally, an agent that ﬁnds itself in a
dynamic,evolvingenvironment(includingevolutionbroughtaboutbyitsownactions)willberequired
to change its beliefs about the environment as the environment evolves.
Theoriesofbeliefchangehavereceivedconsiderableattentioninrecent yearsintheAIcommunity,
as well as other areas such as philosophyand database systems. One crucial distinctionthat has come
to light in this work is that between belief revision and belief update. The distinction can be best un-
derstood as one pertainingto the source of incorrect beliefs. On the one hand, an agent’s beliefs about
theworldmay simplybemistakenorincomplete,forinstance,inthecasewhere itadoptssomedefault
belief. If an agent observes that this beliefis mistaken, it must take stepsto correct the misconception.
Such a process is know as belief revision, of which the theory of Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors and Makin-
son [2, 15] is the best-known characterization. On the other hand, an agent’s beliefs, while correct at
one time, may have become inaccurate due to changes in the world. As events occur and other agents
act, or as the agent itself takes actions, certain facts become true and others false. An agent observing
such processes or their results must take steps to ensure its state of belief reﬂects these changes. This
process is known as belief update, as proposed by Winslett [33] and Katsuno and Mendelzon [21].
On thesurface, formalizationsofrevisionand updateare quitesimilar: in bothcases, theobjective
is to deﬁne a function that, given the agent’s belief state and an “observed” proposition,returns a new
belief state. However, conceptually these two processes have been treated distinctly, and the axioms
and semantic models proposed to capture revision and update are, for the most part, incompatible—
that is, we cannot treat update as a form of revision, norcan we treat revisionas a form of update. The
properties of these processes are, we shall argue, fundamentally different.
One difﬁculty with the separation of revision and update is the fact that routinebelief change, that
is the change of an agent’s belief state in response to some observation,typicallyinvolveselements of
both. Wewillsupportbelowtheclaimthatagivenobservationoftencallsforbeliefchangethatreﬂects
a response to changes in the world as well as incorrect or incomplete prior beliefs. In this paper, we
describe a semantic model for belief change that uniﬁes the two types of belief change. In particular,
2we generalize classicalbelief updateto incorporateaspects of beliefrevision. The aimof thismodel is
twofold. First,weprovideaunifyingandnaturalsemanticsforbothrevisionand updatethathighlights
the orthogonalroles both have to play in routinebelief change. Second, we attempt to provide a more
compelling account of belief update to deal with observations of changes in the world that provide
information about the prior world state (i.e., about the agent’s prior beliefs). This second objective is
a response to difﬁculties with the classical view of update, which we outline below.
The result of this union is a more robust and realistic notion of update in which observations of
changecan informan agent’spriorbeliefsandexpectations. Such observationsare pervasive;consider
the followingexample. A warehouse control agent believes it is snowingon Route 1 after yesterday’s
weather forecast, and expects the arrival of a number of trucks to be delayed. Now suppose a certain
truck arrives,causingtheagentto updateitsbeliefs;furthermore, contrary toitsexpectations,thetruck
arrives on time. There are two possible explanations: either the truck was able to speed through the
snow or it did not snow after all. If the latter explanation is more plausible, current update theories
cannot arrive at the desired update in a natural way. The observationof the change in the world’s state
(arrival of the truck) indicates that the agent’s prior beliefs (e.g., that it is snowing) were wrong. The
updateshouldnotsimplyinvolvechanges thatreﬂect theevolutionoftheworld,butshouldplacethese
changes in the context of the corrected or revised prior beliefs. The agent should revise its beliefs to
capture the fact that it is did not snow and adjust its expectations regarding the arrival of other trucks
accordingly. Routinebelief changes often involveaspects of revision(correcting or augmenting one’s
beliefs) and update (allowing beliefs about the world to “evolve”).
The general model we present to capture such considerations takes as a starting point the notion
of ranked or structured belief sets. By ranking situations according to their degree of plausibility,we
obtain a natural way of assessing degrees of belief and a very natural semantics for belief revision.
Such models have been used extensively for revision [20, 15, 6]. To this we add the notion of a tran-
sition or evolution from one world state to another. As proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM),
updates reﬂect changes in the world, and transitions can be used to model such changes. However, in
contrast to the KM model and following our earlier work [8], we assume that the relative plausibility
of transitions (and hence possible updates) is not something that is judged directly; rather we assume
that events or actions provide the impetus for change. The plausibilityof a transition is a function of:
(a) the plausibilityof possiblecausing events; and (b) the likelihoodof that event having the speciﬁed
outcome. Inthisway,wecan modeleventsoractionsthathavedefeasibleeffects (whichcan bejudged
as more or less likely).
Finally, in response to an observation,an agent attempts to explain the observation by postulating
3conditions under which that observation is expected. An explanation consists of three components:
initialconditions,an event(oraction),andan outcomeofthatevent. Thekey aspectofourmodel isthe
ranking of such explanations — an explanation is more or less plausibledepending on the plausibility
of theinitialconditions,theplausibilityoftheevent giventhat startingpoint,and theplausibilityofthe
event’s outcome. The belief change that results provides the essence of the generalized update (GU)
operator: an agent believes the consequences of the most plausible explanations of the observation.
Unlike other theories of update, our model allows an agent to trade off the likelihood of possible
events, outcomes and prior beliefs in coming up with plausible explanations of an observation. Of
course, by allowing prior beliefs to be “changed” during update, we are essentially folding belief re-
vision into the update process (as we elaborate below). We thus generalize the KM update model to
work onstructured(ratherthanﬂat)beliefsets. Furthermore, theinformationrequiredtogeneratesuch
explanationsisverynaturalandreadilyavailable. Wearemuch morewillingtojudgetherelativeplau-
sibility of events and their outcomes than the plausibilityof transitionsdirectly. The resulting change
in belief, consisting of the consequences of the explanation, is very intuitive.
In Section 2 we present the AGM theory of revision and the KM theory of update, focusing pri-
marily on the semantic models that have been proposed. In our presentation, we adopt the qualitative
probabilistic model of [31, 18, 19]. In Section 3 we present our model of generalized update, with
an emphasis on semantics, and contrast it with the “ﬂat” KM model. We describe two examples to
illustrate the key features of the model.
In Section 4 we analyze the GU operator in detail. We describe the formal relationship between
revision, update and GU. We show that under certain assumptions GU satisﬁes the KM postulates,
though we argue that these assumptions are not appropriate in many settings (thus calling into ques-
tion the generality of the KM postulates). In addition we show that both “ﬂat” KM update and AGM
revision are special cases of GU.In particular, theconnection formally veriﬁes theintuitionthat AGM
revision is due to changes in belief about a static world, while update reﬂects belief change about an
evolving world.
In Section 5, we brieﬂy discuss the importance of iterated revision in this model, and emphasize
connections between GU and Bayesian update in stochastic dynamical systems. We also discuss the
role of observations and weight of evidence, and present a model (as well as several alternative sug-
gestions) for dealing with “noisy” observations in belief revision. This is one area of belief revision
and belief update that has received virtually no attention.
There have been attempts to providegeneral semantics forbelief change operators (e.g., [12]); but
often thesemodels are such that under certainassumptionsthechange is a revision and under others it
4is an update. In Section 6 we compare some of these related models to GU. We conclude in Section 7
with some directions for future research. Proofs of the main results are found in the appendix.
2 Classical Belief Revision and Belief Update
In this section we review, in turn, the AGM and KM theories of belief change. We present both the
syntactic postulates and the semantic models that characterize these theories and describe brieﬂy the
 -calculus of [31, 18, 19], which provides an alternative model for the ordering relationships used by
both theories.
Throughout,weassumethatanagenthasadeductivelyclosedbeliefset
K,asetofsentencesdrawn
from some logical languagereﬂecting the agent’s beliefs about the current state of theworld. For ease
of presentation,we assume a logicallyﬁnite, classical propositionallanguage, denoted
LCPL, and con-
sequence operation Cn.1 The belief set
K will often be generated by some ﬁnite knowledge base KB
(i.e.,
K
  Cn
 KB
 ). The identically true and false propositions are denoted
  and
 , respectively.
Given a set of possible worlds (or valuations over
LCPL)
W and
A
 
LCPL, we denote by
k
A
k the set
of
A-worlds,theelements of
W satisfying
A. Theworlds satisfyingall sentences ina set
K is denoted
k
K
k.
2.1 Belief Revision
Given a belief set
K, an agent will often obtain information
A not present in
K. In this case,
K must
be revised to incorporate
A. If
A is consistent with
K, one expects
A to simply be added to
K: we
call
K
 
A
  Cn
 
K
 
f
A
g
  the expansion of
K by
A. More problematic is the case when
K
 
 
A;
certain beliefs must be given up before
A is adopted. The AGM theory provides a set of guidelines,in
the form of the following postulates, governing this process. We use
K
 
A to denote the revision of
K
by
A.
(R1)
K
 
A is a belief set (i.e., deductively closed).
(R2)
A
 
K
 
A.
(R3)
K
 
A
 
K
 
A.
1Languageswithadenumerablesetofatomicvariables,orﬁrstorderlanguagesposenospecialdifﬁculties(e.g., seework
on ﬁrst-order conditional logics).
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A
 
 
K then
K
 
A
 
K
 
A.
(R5)
K
 
A
  Cn
 
 
  iff
 
 
A.
(R6) If
j
 
A
 
B then
K
 
A
 
K
 
B.
(R7)
K
 
A
 
B
 
 
K
 
A
 
 
B.
(R8) If
 
B
 
 
K
 
A then
 
K
 
A
 
 
B
 
K
 
A
 
B.
Unfortunately,whilethe postulatesconstrainpossiblerevisions,they do not dictatetheprecise be-
liefsthatshouldberetracted when
Aisobserved. Analternativemodelofrevision,basedonthenotion
of epistemic entrenchment [15], has a more constructivenature. Given a belief set
K, we can charac-
terize therevisionof
K by orderingbeliefs according to ourwillingnessto givethem up. If oneof two
beliefs must be retracted in order to accommodate some new fact, the less entrenched belief will be
relinquished, while the more entrenched persists.
Semantically, an entrenchment relation(hence a revisionfunction)can be modeled usingan order-
ing on possible worlds reﬂecting their relative plausibility [20, 6]. However, rather than use a quali-
tative ranking relation, we adopt the presentation of [31, 18] and rank all possible worlds using a
 -
ranking. Such a ranking
 
 
W
 
N assigns to each world a natural number reﬂecting its plausibility
or degree of believability. If
 
 
w
 
 
 
 
v
  then
w is more plausible than
v or “more consistent” with
the agent’s beliefs. We insist that
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , so that maximally plausible worlds are assigned rank
 . These maximally plausible worlds are exactly those consistent with the agent’s beliefs; that is, the
epistemically possible worlds according to
K are those deemed most plausible in
  (see [31] for fur-
ther details). We sometimes assume
 is a partialfunction,and looselywrite
 
 
w
 
 
  to mean
 
 
w
 
is not deﬁned (i.e.,
w is not in the domain of
 , or
w is impossible).
Rather than modeling an agent’s epistemic state with a “ﬂat” unstructured belief set
K, we use a
 -ranking to capture objectivebeliefs
K as well as entrenchment information that determines how an
agent will revise
K. An epistemic state
  induces the (objective) belief set
K
 
f
A
 
LCPL
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k
A
k
g
In other words, the set of most plausible worlds (those such that
 
 
w
 
 
 ) determine the agent’s be-
liefs. Theranking
 also inducesa revisionfunction: toreviseby
Aan agent adoptsthemost plausible
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Figure 1: A Revision Model
A-worlds as epistemically possible. Thus, using
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
  to denote this set, we have
K
 
A
 
f
B
 
LCPL
 
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
 
 
k
B
k
g
If
k
A
k
 
W
 
 , we set
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
 
 
  and
K
 
A
 
LCPL (the inconsistent belief set). It is normally
assumedthat
k
A
k
 
W
 
 
 foreverysatisﬁable
A—thuseverypropositionisaccordedsomedegreeof
plausibility. It is well-knownthat thistype of model induces the class of revisionfunctions sanctioned
by the AGM postulates [20, 6, 18].2
The ranking function
  can naturally be interpreted as characterizing the degree to which an agent
is willingto accept certain alternativestates ofaffairs as epistemicallypossible. As such itseems to be
appropriate for modeling changes in belief about an unchanging world. The most plausible
A-worlds
in our assessment of the current state of affairs are adopted when
A is observed.
As an example, considertherankingshownin Figure1, which reﬂects theepistemicstateofsome-
one who believes her book and glasses are on the patio. If she were to learn that in fact her book is
inside, she would also believe her glasses are inside, for the most plausible Inside
 
B
 -world (
 
 
 )
also satisﬁes Inside
 
G
 . This model captures that fact that she strongly believes she left her book and
glasses in the same place; that is, the belief Patio
 
B
 
  Patio
 
G
  is more entrenched than either of
the beliefs Patio
 
B
  or Patio
 
G
 .
2We refer to [4, 6, 12, 19] for a discussionof languageswith whichone canexpressproperties of belief sets and revision
functions. These languagescan be used to express belief, degrees of entrenchment and plausibility, conditional belief, and
so on.
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 -rankings as assigning degrees of plausibility to propositions;we deﬁne
 
 
A
 
 
m
i
n
w
j
 
A
f
 
 
w
 
g
This can beinterpreted as thedegree to whichproposition
A is accepted as plausible(where
 
 
A
 
 
 
means
A is maximally plausible,or consistent with the agent’s beliefs). We will also have occasion to
use the notion of conditional plausibility;we deﬁne
 
 
B
j
A
 
 
 
 
A
 
B
 
 
 
 
A
 
Intuitively, this denotes the degree to which
B would be considered plausible if
A were believed.
These notions are strongly reminiscent of standard concepts from probability theory. In fact, a
 -ranking can be interpreted as a semi-qualitative probability distribution. Using the
 -semantics of
Adams [1], Goldszmidtand Pearl [17]showhowonecan interpretthe(unconditionaland conditional)
  values of propositions as “order of magnitude” probabilities. Under this interpretation, one is able
to deﬁne analogs of various probabilisticoperations,including conditionalization(see Section 5). We
do not delve into the details of “
 -arithmetic” here, nor the details of the precise relationship of these
rankingfunctionstoprobabilitydistributions. Wereferto[31,17,19]fordetails. Wedonote,however,
that addition, multiplication and division of probabilities correspond to the minimum, addition and
subtraction operations, respectively, for
 -rankings. Thus the deﬁnition of
 
 
B
j
A
  above can be seen
as a direct counterpart of the usual deﬁnition of conditional probability.
Muchofthesemanticswedeﬁnebelowcouldbereinterpretedinapurelyqualitativeframeworkfor
beliefrevision(andbeliefupdate)inwhichasimpleorderingrelation
 isusedtorankpossibleworlds.
However, as will become evident in Sections 4 and 5, much of what we do relies on the expressive
power afforded by a quantitativeranking. In particular, our semantics will require that one be able to
combine plausibilitiesthat are speciﬁed using several distinct rankings. With quantitative
 -rankings,
this is straightforward, whereas qualitative rankings do not permit this unless explicit “calibration”
information is provided. We elaborate on this in Sections 4 and 5.
2.2 Belief Update
Katsuno and Mendelzon [21] have proposed a general characterization of belief updatethat seems ap-
propriate when an agent wishes to change its beliefs to reﬂect changes in, or evolution of, the world.
The KM theory is also captured by a set of postulates and an equivalent semantic model. Following
8[21], we describe update in terms of a knowledge base KB rather than a deductively closed belief set
K.
If some new fact
A is observed in response to some (unspeciﬁed) change in the world (i.e., some
action or event occurrence), then the formula KB
 
A denotes the new belief set incorporating this
change. The KM postulates governing admissible update operators are:
(U1) KB
 
A
 
A
(U2) If KB
 
A then KB
 
A
  KB
(U3) If KB and
A are satisﬁable, then KB
 
A is satisﬁable
(U4) If
 
A
 
B, KB
 
  KB
  then KB
 
 
A
  KB
 
 
B
(U5)
 KB
 
A
 
 
B
  KB
 
 
A
 
B
 
(U6) If KB
 
A
 
B and KB
 
B
 
A then KB
 
A
  KB
 
B
(U7) If KB is complete then
 KB
 
A
 
 
 KB
 
B
 
  KB
 
 
A
 
B
 
(U8)
 KB
 
  KB
 
 
 
A
 
 KB
 
 
A
 
 
 KB
 
 
A
 
Theequivalentsemanticmodel ofKM shedsmore lighton theintuitionsunderlyingupdate.
kKB
k
represents the set of possibilities we are prepared to accept as the actual state of affairs. Since obser-
vation
A is the result of some change in the actual world, we ought to consider, for each possibility
w
 
kKB
k, the most plausible way (or ways) in which
w might have changed in order to make
A
true. That is, we want to consider the most plausible evolution of world
w into a world satisfying
the observation
A. To capture this intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon propose a family of preorders
f
 
w
 
w
 
W
g, where each
 
w is a reﬂexive, transitiverelation over
W. We interpret each such rela-
tion as follows: if
u
 
w
v then
u is at least as plausiblea change relative to
w as is
v; that is, situation
w would more readily evolve into
u than it would into
v.
Finally, a faithfulnesscondition is imposed: for every world
w, the preorder
 
w has
w as a mini-
mum element; that is,
w
 
w
v forall
v
 
 
w. Naturally,themost plausiblecandidatechanges in
w that
result in
A are those worlds
v satisfying
A that are minimal in the relation
 
w. The set of such min-
imal
A-worlds for each relation
 
w, and each
w
 
kKB
k, intuitively capture the situations we ought
to accept as possiblewhen updating KB with
A. In other words,
kKB
 
A
k
 
 
w
 
kKB
k
f
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
w
 
g
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Figure 2: An Update Model
where
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
w
  is the set of minimal elements in
k
A
k (w.r.t.
 
w).
Updateoperators determinedby any familyofpreorders
f
 
w
 
w
 
W
gsatisfytheKM postulates.
The converse also holds: any KM operator can be represented by such a semantic model. Moreover,
if the orderings
 
w are total preorders (so that all elements are comparable), then updateoperators are
characterized by (U1)–(U9) (see [21, 8]):
(U9) If KB is complete,
 KB
 
A
 
 
 
 
B and
 KB
 
A
 
 
C then
 KB
 
 
A
 
B
 
 
 
C
We assume for the most part that we are dealing with such total update operators (but we discuss this
further in Section 4). It shouldbe clear howthis(total)model can be recast in terms of
 -rankings: we
simply associate a ranking
 
w with each world
w (such that
 
 
 
w
 
 
 
 
f
w
g) and use
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
w
  to
update by
A. Note that the use of
 -rankings requires that the orderings be total.
As a concrete example, suppose that someone observes that the grass in front of her house is wet.
Prior to the observation, she believed that she left her book outside on the patio and that the grass
and book were dry (see KB in Figure 2). As shown in the ﬁgure, the most plausible evolution of the
epistemically possible world
w, given the wet grass, is
v; hence she believes her book got wet too.
This may bedueto thefact thatthe mostlikelycause ofwet grass is rain, which dampens thingson the
patioas well. Alessplausibletransition(world
u)iscaused bythesprinklerbeingactivated. However,
had she observed Dry(B) in addition to Wet(G), she would have accepted this less plausible sprinkler
explanation—that the sprinkler had been turned on—and any of its additional consequences, such as
her glasses being dry if they are with her book.
102.3 An Event-Based Semantics for Update
One of the difﬁculties with the KM update semantics is the interpretation of the orderings
 
w. This
semantics supposes that it is “natural” to directly rank possible evolutions of a world
w. In [8] we
argue that evolutions or changes in the world should not be ranked directly. We suppose that events
or actions provide the impetus for change, and the plausibility of a given evolution is determined by
the plausibilityoftheevent that caused thechange. Thisapproach is motivatedby theobservationthat
users can often more readily assess the relative plausibility of an event (in a given context) and the
effects of that event, as opposed to directly assessing the plausibility of an evolution.
Apartfromprovidingamoreintuitivesemanticfoundationforbeliefupdate,thisevent-basedmodel
is more general than the KM model, and can be used to show that some of the KM postulates are too
restrictive to be viewed as a general characterization of the process of belief update [8]. In order to
unify update and revision, rather than generalizing the KM update semantics directly, we will base
our unifying model on the event-based semantics of [8]. We brieﬂy review the basic elements of this
semantics.3
We assume a set of events
E. An event
e maps each world into another world, and can be viewed
as a function (perhaps partial),
e
 
W
 
W. The world
e
 
w
  is the outcome of event
e at world
w.
Events such as these are therefore deterministic.4
Since an agent making an observationwill oftennot knowa prioriwhat event caused theobserved
fact to hold, we assume that each world has associated with it an event ordering
 
 
w
  that describes
the plausibility of various event occurrences at that world. Formally,
 
 
W
 
 
E
 
N
 ; we write
 
w to denote the ranking
 
 
w
 . Intuitively,
 
w
 
e
  captures the plausibilityof the occurrence of event
e at world
w. Again, weassume
 
w is a partial functionover
E,with
 
w
 
e
 
 
  taken to mean that
e
cannot occur at
w. For each
w, we require that
 
w
 
e
 
 
  for some event
e (perhaps several), so that
at least one event is considered most plausible. We take the set of events and the ranking functions
 
w
to constitutean event model EM.
With an event orderingin hand, onecan easily rank thepossibleevolutionsofa world
w according
to the relative plausibility of the events that could cause that evolution. In particular, we can deﬁne
an outcome ranking
 
w for world
w over the set
W, where
 
w
 
v
  denotes the degree of plausibility
3Ourpresentationwill relyontheuseof
 -rankings(whichimposetotal preorders), whereasthesemanticsin [8]is purely
qualitative (and permits preorders asplausibility relations). In the few placeswhere this inﬂuencesresults, we will makethe
distinction clear.
4In [8], nondeterministic actions are captured by allowing set-valued outcomes. In Section 3 below, we will want to
generalize this further to allow these nondeterministic outcomes to be ranked accordingto plausibility.
11associated with the transition of world
w to world
v. This can be deﬁned as
 
w
 
v
 
 
m
i
n
e
 
E
f
 
w
 
e
 
 
e
 
w
 
 
v
g
In otherwords, the evolutionof
w into
v is exactly as plausibleas the most plausibleevent that causes
w to evolve into
v.
In the case of a deterministicevent model, we can deﬁne a belief update operator as follows:
kKB
 EM
A
k
 
 
w
 
kKB
k
f
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
w
 
g
In other words, we simply use the ranking
 
w as we would the plausible change ordering
 
w in the
KM model. One distinction is that for any observation
A, one can use the event model to generate an
explanation for that observation. In other words, one can determine the event-conditionpairs, for any
condition consistent with KB, such that event
e is the most plausible cause of the observation
A. To
revisit the example above, the ordering
 
w in Figure 2 may be induced by the event ranking where
 
w
 rain
 
 
  and
 
w
 sprinkler
 
 
 . Not only is the belief Wet(B) a consequence of observation
Wet(G), but the explanation “It rained” is also forthcoming. We refer to [8] for further details.
One can showthat the event-based semantics for updategeneralizes theKM model. Underpartic-
ularassumptions,theclassesofupdateoperatorsdetermined by each semantics coincide,thoughsome
of the necessary requirements on event models may, in certain cases, be unnecessarily restrictive [8].
We deferdiscussionofthisissueuntilweexamineourgeneralizationofthisevent-basedsemanticsbe-
low. Aﬁnal advantageofthis model is that it lends itselfreadily to thegeneralizationsrequired to deal
with nondeterministic events with outcomes of varying plausibilities, as well as the incorporation of
belief revision into the pictureto provide a unifying semantics of belief change in dynamical systems.
3 GeneralizedUpdate
In this section we ﬁrst describe some of the difﬁculties with the KM theory of update, as well as the
event-based semantics described above, when it comes to dealing with the routinebelief change of an
agent embedded in a dynamical system. We then present the generalized update model, and illustrate
the basic intuitions by means of two examples. We defer a formal analysis of its properties until the
following section.
123.1 Difﬁculties with KM Update
One difﬁculty with the KM theory of update is that it does not allow an observation to force revision
of an agent’s beliefs about the state of the world prior to the observation. This is a crucial drawback,
for even thoughone may not care about outdatedbeliefs directly, informationgained about one’s prior
state of belief can inﬂuence updated beliefs.
Even simple tasks such as modeling information gathering actions are beyond the scope of KM
update. Consider, for example, Moore’s [26] litmus test: the contents of a beaker are unknown and
one dips litmus paper into it to determine if it is an acid or a base. The prior state of belief is captured
by two possibleworlds—in bothof these worlds,thelitmus papers is some neutral color(say, yellow),
and in one the proposition acid holds, while in the other base is true. The color of the paper after the
test action should rule out one of the possibilities. Unfortunately, the KM theory does not allow this
to take place; the semantics of update requires that both prior possibilities be updated to reﬂect the
observed color (e.g., blue). One is forced to accept that, if the contents were acidic (in which case it
should turn red), some extraordinary change occurred (the test failed, the contents of the beaker were
switched, etc.). Note that one cannot escape the dilemma by supposingthere is no such transition,for
postulate (U3) ensures that updating acid by blue is consistent [8].
We can relax the KM update model to allow certain KB-worlds to be ruled out if the observation
is not reachable through any “reasonable” transition from that world. This would dictate the addition
of machinery to give a meaningful interpretation to the term “reasonable.” But we must go further.
It may be that an observation “conﬂicts” with all KB-worlds. To continue the example, imagine the
contents of the beaker are not unknown,but are believed to be acidic. If the test result is blue, the KM
model requires the agent to postulate some (very unusual) transition from a world where the beaker
contains an acid to a world where the paper is blue. Of course, the right thing to do is simply admit
that the beaker did not, in fact, contain an acid—the agent should revise its beliefs about the contents
of thebeaker. In order todo this,wemust extend themodel ofupdateto deal with structuredorranked
belief sets so that we have some guidancefor the revision of ourbeliefs. In general, beliefchange will
involve certain aspects of both revision and update.
3.2 Generalized Update Semantics
Rather than generalizing the KM update semantics directly, we adopt the event-based approach de-
scribed in Section 2.3. As above, we assume a set of events
E. However, we allow these events to be
nondeterministic, and each possible outcome of an event is ranked according to its plausibility. For
13example, an attempt to pick up a block will likely result in a world where the block is held, but occa-
sionally will fail, leaving the agent empty-handed.
Deﬁnition 3.1 An event
e maps each world into a (partial)
 -ranking over worlds,
e
 
W
 
 
W
 
N
 . We use
 
w
 
e to denote the ranking
e
 
w
 .
Intuitively,
 
w
 
e
 
v
 describes the plausibilitythat world
v results when event
e occurs at world
w. We
say
v isapossibleoutcomeof
eat
w iff
 
w
 
e
 
v
 is deﬁned(i.e., if
 
w
 
e
 
v
 
 
 
 ). Wecall thisevolution
of
w into
v, under the speciﬁed event
e, a transition, which we write
w
e
 
v. We note that since
 
w
 
e is a
 -ranking, we must have
 
w
 
e
 
v
 
 
  for some
v; that is, some outcome of event
e must be
most plausible. We occasionally assume the existence of the null event
n, such that
 
w
 
n
 
w
 
 
  and
 
w
 
n
 
v
 
 
  if
w
 
 
v. The null event ensures (with certainty) that the world does not change.
As in the original event-based semantics, we will assume each world has an event ordering asso-
ciated with it that describes the plausibilityof various event occurrences at that world.
Deﬁnition 3.2 An event ordering
  maps each world into a (partial)
 -ranking over the set of events
E,
 
 
W
 
 
E
 
N
 . We write
 
w to denote the ranking
 
 
w
 .
To reiterate,
 
w
 
e
 captures theplausibilityoftheoccurrenceof event
e at world
w. Again,weassume
 
w is a partial functionover
E, with
 
w
 
e
 
 
  taken to mean that
e cannot occur at
w. We also note
again that
 
w
 
e
 
 
  for some
e (i.e., some event is most plausible).
Finally, we assume that an agent’s epistemic state, its beliefs about the current state of the world,
are reﬂected in a straightforward
 -ranking
  over
W. The plausibility accorded to world
w is just
 
 
w
 . These three components are put together to form a generalized update model.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A generalized update model has the form
M
 
h
W
 
 
 
E
 
 
i, where
W is a set of
worlds,
  is a
 -ranking over
W (the agent’s epistemic state),
E is a set of events (mappings
 
w
 
e over
W), and
  is an event ordering (a set of mappings
 
w over
E). We assume that
K is
the belief set induced by
 .
In summary, an agent must have informationabout the nature of the current stateof world (
 ), what is
likely to happen or not (
 ), and the effects of those event occurrences (
E). Such models contain the
information necessary to update
K in responseto an observation
A; we denote the resulting belief set
K
 
A. We now describe the update process.
To begin, we suppose that one “tick of the clock” has passed and that the agent must update its
ranking
  to reﬂect the possible occurrence of certain events, without the beneﬁt of observation. In-
tuitively, the posterior plausibilityof a world
v depends on the plausibilityof the transitions that lead
14to
v. The plausibility of a transition
w
e
 
v depends on the plausibility of
w, the likelihood that
e
occurred, and the likelihood of outcome
v given
w
 
e. In other words:5
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e
 
 
 
 
w
  (1)
With this in hand, an updated ranking
 
  can be given by
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m
i
n
w
 
W
 
e
 
E
f
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e
 
v
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e
 
 
 
 
w
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E
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w
e
 
v
 
g (2)
This epistemic state essentially captures the notion that the world has evolved one “step” but that the
agent has noinformation aboutthenatureofthis transition(otherthan thatcontainedin themodel
M).
We note that the agent’s actual beliefs are determined by the minimal worlds in
 
  (i.e., those
v such
that
 
 
 
v
 
 
 ). We sometimes refer to
 
  as the anticipated or predicted updated ranking.
As with KM update, updates usually occur in response to some observation, with the assumption
that something occurred to cause this observation. After observing
A an agent should adjust its be-
liefs by considering that only the most plausibletransitionsleading to
A actually occurred. The set of
possible
A-transitionsis:
Tr
 
A
 
 
f
w
e
 
v
 
v
j
 
A and
 
 
w
e
 
v
 
 
 
 
g
The most plausible
A-transitions,denoted
m
i
n
 Tr
 
A
 
 , are thosepossible
A-transitionswith themin-
imal
 -ranking. Given that
A has actually been observed, an agent should assume that one of these
transitions describes the actual course of events. The worlds judged to be epistemically possible are
those that result from the most plausible of these transitions:
result
 
A
 
 
f
v
 
w
e
 
v
 
m
i
n
 Tr
 
A
 
 
g
Deﬁnition 3.4 Let
K be the belief set determined by update model
M. The generalized update of
K
by
A (w.r.t
M) is
K
 
A
 
f
B
  result
 
A
 
 
k
B
k
g
5We note that this formula is the qualitative analog of the probabilistic equation Pr
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w
 
e
 
  Pr
 
e
j
w
 
 
Pr
 
w
  as described in Section 2.1.
15In other words, an agent updating by observation
A believes what is true at the states that result from
the most plausible
A-transitions.6
This model views generalized update by
A as the process of determining the most plausible ways
in which
Amay havebeen broughtabout. Itisnothard toseethatthevery samebeliefchangeoperator
is dictated by the process of ﬁrst determining the predicted updated ranking
 
  followed by (standard
AGM) revision by
A with respect to
 
 .
Proposition 3.1 result
 
A
 
 
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
 
 ; or, equivalently,
K
 
A
 
f
B
 
m
i
n
 
A
 
 
 
 
 
k
B
k
g
This conforms to our intuitions about the updating process: the direct update of
K by
A,
K
 
A, deter-
mines the same belief set as the process of ﬁrst updating one’s entire epistemic state
  to get
 
 , and
then performing belief revision of
 
  by the observation
A. Loosely, we might say
 
K
 
 
 
A
 
K
 
A.
This notion of update naturally gives rise to the notion of an explanation for observation
A. We
can view updating by
A as a process of postulating the most likely explanations for
A and adopting
the consequences of these explanations as our new beliefs. Unlike update of unstructured belief sets,
explanationsmust consider(and trade-off) plausibleinitialconditions,events and event outcomes that
lead to
A.
Deﬁnition 3.5 An explanationfor
A(givenmodel
M)isanytriple
h
w
 
e
 
v
isuchthat
w
e
 
v
  Tr
 
A
 
(which implies
 
 
w
e
 
v
 
 
 ).
An explanation thus takes the form “It is possible that
e occurred at
w, leading to
v and resulting in
A.” Of course, many of these explanation can be highly implausible.
Deﬁnition 3.6 The triple
h
w
 
e
 
v
iis a most plausibleexplanation for
A iff
w
e
 
v
 
m
i
n
 Tr
 
A
 
 .
In other words, the most plausibleexplanations are those explanations with minimal
 -ranking.
If
A is explainable (i.e., if the set of explanations is not empty), then the most plausible expla-
nations correspond to the most plausible
A-transitions: thus generalized update can be interpreted as
an abductive process. Given observation
A, we can determine our updated belief set by ﬁrst ﬁnding
the most plausibleexplanationsfor
A, and thenadoptingthe“consequences”of theseexplanationsare
ournewbeliefset. Itissimplytheformoftheexplanation—“somethingwastrue,somethingoccurred,
and it had this outcome leading to observation
A”— that is more complex than in many other forms
of abduction. Note, however, that Proposition 1 means we are not required to generate explanations
explicitly in order to produce the updated belief set.
6Note that the exact form of
  depends on the entire generalized update model
M. To keep notation simple, we do not
subscript the operator; the update model deﬁning
  should always be clear from context.
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k=1
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k=1
k=2
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Figure 3: Generalized Update with Multiple Events
3.3 Examples
Before considering the formal properties of this model, we illustrateits nature with two examples. To
keep the treatment simple, in the ﬁrst example we use only deterministic events, while in the second
we assume a single nondeterministicevent (the agent’s action).
Figure 3 illustrates the prior belief state of an agent who believes her book is on the patio and that
both the grass and her book are dry. However, if her book is not on the patio, she believes she has left
it inside (
 
 Inside
 
B
 
 
 
 ). We omit other less plausible worlds. We assume three events: it might
rain, the sprinkler might be turned on, or nothing happens (the null event). She judges
 
w
 null
 
 
 ,
 
w
 rain
 
 
  and
 
w
 sprinkler
 
 
 , so rain is more plausible than sprinkler (we assume a “global”
ordering, suitablefor all
w). The outcomes of these events are deterministic— in particular, both rain
and thesprinklerwill makethegrass wet, butthebook willonlyget wet ifit rains and itis on thepatio.
Now, if wet grass is observed, our agent will update her beliefs to accept Wet(G). A consequence of
this is that she will now believe her book is wet: the most likely explanation is simply that it rained.
If Wet(G)
  Dry(B) are both observed (for instance, if she is told the book is safe), there are two most
plausibleposteriorworldssatisfyingtheobservation(i.e.,
 
 Wet(G)
 Dry(B)
 
 
 ). Thiscorresponds
to theexistenceoftwo plausibleexplanations: eitherthebook is on the patio(
 
 
 ) and thesprinkler
turned on (
 
 
 ); or the book is inside(
 
 
 ) and it rained (
 
 
 ). The result of this update on the
agent’s state of belief is such that the agent is no longer sure where the book is. If we had instead set
17Kryp  Yellow
k=0 k=0
k=r k=r
Acid  Red
Base  Blue
Base  Green
Acid  Green
Kryp  Green
Base  Yellow
Acid  Yellow
k=g
Figure 4: Generalized Update with Multiple Action Outcomes
 
 sprinkler
 
 
 ,observingWet(G)
 Dry(B)wouldhavecaused theagenttobelievethatthebookhad
been inside all along. The sprinkler explanation for the dry book becomes less plausible than having
leftthebookinside. Weseethenthatobservingcertainchangesintheworldcancauseanagenttorevise
its beliefs about previous states of affairs. These revisions can impact on subsequent predictions and
behavior (e.g., if the book is inside then so are her glasses).7
A second example is shown in Figure 4. We assume only one possible event (or action), that of
dippinglitmuspaperinabeaker. Thebeakerisbelievedtocontaineitheranacidorabase(
 
 
 ); little
plausibility(
 
 
r) is accorded the possibilitythat it contains some other substance (say, kryptonite).
The expected outcome of the test is a color change of the litmus paper: it changes from yellow to red
if the substance is an acid, to blue if it is a base, and to green if it is kryptonite. However, the litmus
test can fail some small percentageof thetime, in which case thepaper also turnsgreen. Thisoutcome
is also accorded little plausibility (
 
 
g). If the paper is dipped, and red is observed, the agent will
adopt the new belief acid. Unlike KM update, generalized update permits observations to rule out
possible transitions, or previously epistemically possible worlds. As such, it is an appropriate model
for revision and expansion of beliefs due to information-gathering actions. An observed outcome of
green presents two competing explanations: either the test failed (the substance is an acid or a base,
and we still don’t knowwhich) or the beaker contains kryptonite. The most plausibleexplanationand
the updated belief state depend on the relative magnitudes of
g and
r. The ﬁgure suggests that
g
 
r,
so thea test failureis most plausibleand thebelief acid
 baseis retained. If test failures are more rare
7The world satisfying Inside
 
B
 
 Dry(B)
 Wet(G) at
 
 
  is shown for illustration. Technically, that world has rank
 
since it occursbelow, andthe explanation“sprinklerandbookinside”will neverbeadopted, unlessfurther propositionsand
observations can distinguish the two worlds (e.g., other effects of the eventsin question).
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r
 
g), then this outcome would cause the agent to believe the beaker held kryptonite.
4 Relationship to Revision and Update
We now turn to the question of the relationship of GU to the classical AGM revision and KM update
models. The analysis of the update postulates is in many ways similar to that presented in [8], where
the simple event-based semantics of Section 2.3 was developed. There we showed that under certain
assumptions this event-based operator satisﬁes the KM postulates, though we argued that these as-
sumptionsare not always appropriate. Thekey difference here is that theabductiveapproach has been
generalized to allow ranked outcomes of events, and more importantly, ranked belief structures. This
has surprisinglylittleimpact on the analysis of the KM postulates—thebasic models satisfy the same
postulates and the same assumptions can be used to ensure satisfaction of addition postulates—with
one signiﬁcant exception: the postulate(U8) becomes (in a certain sense) meaningless under GU. We
elaborate on this below.
We ﬁrst note that our model satisﬁes a number of the KM postulates.
Proposition 4.1 If
  is the GU operator induced by some GU model then
  satisﬁes postulates (U1),
(U4), (U5), (U6), (U7) and (U9).
We note that GU satisﬁes the all of the same update postulates as the basic event-model for ﬂat belief
states [8].
One key difference between the GU model and the KM model is reﬂected in (U2), which asserts
that KB
 
A is equivalent to KB whenever KB entails
A. This cannot be the case in general, for even
if KB
j
 
A, the most plausible event occurrence may be something that changes another proposition
while leaving
A true. Observing
A may simply mean that the change proceeded as expected.8 (U2) is
appropriateonly ifwe are willingto assume persistenceof propositions,that changes (are believed to)
occur onlyif evidence for them is observed. While appropriatein some settings,this is not a universal
principle suitable for belief change. Nevertheless, we can model it by assuming inert update models,
in which the null event is the most plausiblein any situation.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A GU model
M
 
h
W
 
 
 
E
 
 
iis inert if
E contains the null event
n and
 
 
 
w
 
 
 
 
f
n
g for all
w
 
W.
8Asanexample,consideranassemblylinemonitorthatobservesa“statusOK”signal. Thismaywellalreadybebelieved;
but the agent should still update its belief state by changingits belief about the number of parts that have been produced.
19Proposition 4.2 If
  is induced by an inert GU model then
  satisﬁes (U2).
Thesecond key difference is reﬂected in thefailureof(U3), which assertsthat KB
 
Ais satisﬁable
if
A is. In our model, this corresponds to every
A being explainable no matter what beliefs are held.
GU models need not satisfy (U3). Consider the case where no event can result in an
A-world (i.e.,
where Tr
 
A
 
 
 ): the observation of
A is then unexplainable, and
K
 
A
 
LCPL, the inconsistent
belief set. To prevent this, we can simply insist that every satisﬁable sentence
A is explainable.
Deﬁnition 4.2 AGUmodel
h
W
 
 
 
E
 
 
iis completeiffforany satisﬁable
A
 
LCPL,thereare
w
 
v
 
W,
e
 
E such that
 
 
w
 
 
 ,
 
w
 
e
 
 
 ,
 
w
 
e
 
v
 
 
  and
v
j
 
A.
Proposition 4.3 If
  is induced by a complete GU model then
  satisﬁes (U3).
In [8] we criticized (U3) as inappropriate for the update of ﬂat belief sets. For example, if our
beliefs corresponded to a single world where acid is believed, (U3) forces the observation of blue to
behave quitepoorly (as described above). However, such a maxim is much more reasonable in gener-
alized update. It does not force one to proposewildly implausibletransitionsfrom prior epistemically
possible states; instead one can revise one’s beliefs to account for the observation. In this case, we
simply give up the belief acid. For this reason, (U3) may be seen as a reasonable postulatefor GU, in
which case wemight take complete GUmodels to providethe appropriatesemanticunderpinningsfor
belief revision and update.
There are a number of systematic ways in which one can enforce the condition of completeness
such as requiring the existence of “miraculous” events that can cause anything [8]. In our setting,one
quite reasonable condition we might impose is that all worlds have some plausibility (i.e.,
  is a to-
tal function on
W) and that the null event is possible (though not necessarily very plausible) at each
of those. The ﬁrst requirement is usually assumed of epistemic states (e.g., in the belief revision lit-
erature), and the second simply ensures that all worlds persist with some degree of plausibility. Thus
while explanations of
A may be implausiblethey will not be impossible.
Finally, putting Propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 together we have:
Theorem 4.4 If
  is induced by a complete, inert GU model then
  satisﬁes (U1)–(U7) and (U9).
We note that the converse of this theorem and the preceding propositionsis easy to verify, though not
especially interesting. Primarily, we are interested in determining the nature of belief change given
information about beliefs, events and event orderings, rather than the construction of models that cor-
roborate arbitrary operators satisfying the postulates. We also note that our characterization theorem
20includes(U9)becauseofouruseof
 -rankings,whichtotallyordereventsandworlds. Oneofthemain
reasons for usingsuch rankings,as discussedin Section 2.1, is that theyallowthescales ofplausibility
used to rank worlds,events and outcomes to becompared and added. In general, the useof qualitative
ranking relations does not admit this ﬂexibility unless one is willing to postulatea “metric” by which
a combination of preorders can be compared. This is not a difﬁcult task, but is somewhat more cum-
bersome than theapproach provided here. Equivalentresultsshould be obtainablein the more general
setting of arbitrary preorders.
There aretwo special cases of GUthatare worth mentioningin passing. First, wenotethat “plain”
KM update of unstructured belief sets is easily captured in our model by the simple restriction of
 
to rank worlds only as plausible (
 
 
 ) or impossible (
 
 
 ). Second, reasoning about agent-
controlled action (and observations)is also possible, as indicated in the litmus example. To do so, we
simply view an agent’s actions as events: we associate with each action
a a
 -ranking
 
w
 
a that ranks
outcomes of action
a at world
w. We take the key difference between actions and events (at least, as
far as belief change is concerned) to be that actions are within the agent’s control so that it has direct
knowledge of their occurrence. As such, actions need not be ranked according to their plausibilityof
occurrence, nor do they need to be postulated as part of an explanation. Observations can only be ex-
plained by supposingthe action had a particular (perhaps unexpected) outcome, or by revising beliefs
about the initial conditions,or both.9
To complete our analysis of the KM postulates, we turn our attention to (U8). None of our char-
acterization results involve(U8) because it cannot be enforced in a reasonable way in our model. The
reason for this is our move to ranked models of epistemicstates and our abilityto explain(even “most
plausibly” explain) an observation using initial conditions that conﬂict with our beliefs—that is, our
ability to have observations revise our initial beliefs.
(U8) is the only update postulate that relates the update of different initial states of belief, namely
KB
 , KB
  and KB
 
  KB
 . For a given observation
A, the update of KB
  will generate a set of most
plausibleexplanations
w
e
 
v, where
v
j
 
A. Unfortunately,unless all of these explanationsare such
that
w
 
kKB
 
k, the properties of KB
 
 
A are determined not only by KB
  (together with the event
model), but also by the ranking
  that represents our initial epistemic state. Unless we impose strong
and unnatural conditions on the relationships of the rankings
  upon which our updates of KB
 , KB
 
and KB
 
  KB
  are based, very little can be said about the relationship asserted by (U8). Indeed, we
9Concurrenteventsandactionsrequirespecialattention, however,andarebeyondthescopeofthispaper. Ourframework
is certainly compatible with standard treatments of concurrency.
21mustallowupdatetoproceedforthemanydistinctepistemicstates
 thatdetermineagivenknowledge
base KB.
We note that for a ﬁxed event model (i.e., a ﬁxed
E and
 ), we can relate the update of KB
 , KB
 
and KB
 
  KB
  under the following condition: the updated belief state
K
 
A is a function of the initial
belief state
K (e.g., KB
 , KB
  or KB
 
  KB
 ) and not of the ranking
 . If this is the case, it is easy
to verify that (U8) will be satisﬁed. However, the only circumstance under which this condition will
hold is if a categorical preference is given to explanations for
A of the form
w
e
 
v where
w
 
k
K
k.
But this simply means that one is unwilling to revise ones prior beliefs to account for an observation.
In otherwords,postulate(U8) onlymakes sensewhen we are dealingwith ﬂat,unstructuredepistemic
states—precisely the types of models whose weakness GU is designed to counteract!
Wewrap upbyconsideringhowAGMbeliefrevisioncan bemodeled inourframework. Thecom-
mon folklore states that belief revision is a form of belief change suitable when the world is static or
unchanging. To verify this intuition,we propose static update models.
Deﬁnition 4.3 An updatemodel
M
 
h
W
 
 
 
E
 
 
iis staticif
E
 
f
n
gwhere
n is thenullevent
n.10
Assuming,as is usualin thebeliefrevisionliterature,that
 is a totalfunctionover
W (i.e.,
 
 
w
 
 
 
for all
w
 
W), we obtain the following result:
Theorem 4.5 If
  is induced by a static GU model then
  satisﬁes (R1)–(R8).
Static event models have as the only possible transitions those of the form
w
n
 
w with plausibility
 
 
w
 . Thus,theinformalintuitionaboutbeliefrevision(andtheAGMmodel)canbeveriﬁedformally:
AGM revision is a particular form of GU suitable for a “static” system. (The converse of Theorem 6
is easily veriﬁed.)
We note that the assumption of staticness is in fact much stronger than is needed to prove satis-
faction of the AGM postulates. Indeed, simple inert models will satisfy this condition as well (as we
see in Section 5.1). The reason we consider static models to be the correct specialization of GU for
modeling revision will become clear once we discuss iterated belief update in Section 5.1.
5 Iterated Belief Update and Observations
ThemodelwehavedescribedisstronglyrelatedtostandardBayesianmodelsofbeliefupdateinstochas-
tic dynamical systems. Roughly, in these models, an agent’s epistemic state is captured by a prob-
10As abovewe assume
  is a total function on
W.
22ability distribution. The probabilities associated with various event occurrences and the outcomes of
actionsandeventscan beusedinaBayesianupdatingprocesstodeterminehowtoupdatethisdistribu-
tion givena speciﬁcobservation. The updateddistributioncharacterizes theagent’supdated epistemic
state, which then may be subject to update given subsequent observations.
While the connections to generalized update are quite strong,11 there is one key difference: the
stochasticdynamical system view shows howto produce an updated epistemicstate, not just a simple
belief state. The GU model, as described above, gives a characterization of the agent’s updated belief
state in response to an observation. The belief state itself does not provide guidance for changes in
belief due to subsequent observations.
We address this problem, that of iterated belief change in this section. We ﬁrst elaborate on the
issues of iterated change and update of epistemic states. We then provide a short description of the
basic partiallyobservable, stochasticdynamical system model. Finally, we showhowtheintuitionsof
the quantitative dynamical system model can be captured in several different ways in our qualitative
model (some of these being more direct than others).
5.1 Iterated Belief Change
To illustrate the need for a more elaborate speciﬁcation of generalized update, we consider the rain-
ing example of Section 3.3. GU speciﬁes that an agent with an epistemic state
  given by the initial
rankingin Figure3and whoobserves Wet(G)willpossessthebeliefstate
fPatio
 
B
 
 Wet(B)
 Wet(G)
g.
This corresponds to the revision of the updated ranking
 
  by the observation Wet(G). Unfortunately,
while it speciﬁes an updated belief state, GU fails to dictate an updated epistemicstate (see Figure 5).
Thus,theagent has no ideahowto incorporatesubsequentobservationsingeneral. Forexample, ifthe
agent now observes Dry(B), it requires a legitimate epistemic state (e.g., a ranking) in order to revise
or updatethisnewbeliefstatetoaccount forthenewobservation. Withonlythebasicbeliefstatein its
possession, the new observation is simply inconsistent, unless there is some miraculous book drying
event.
We note that this problem is strongly related to the problem of iterated belief revision: given an
epistemic state and an observation by which an agent’s beliefs are to be revised, how shouldthis epis-
temic state change (not just the belief state). It has been observed by a number of authors that the
11Indeed,theequationsdeﬁninganupdatedrankingandthebeliefstateinducedbyaspeciﬁcobservationcanbeviewedas
qualitativeanalogsofthequantitativerelationsusedfor partially-observablestochasticdynamicalsystems. Thiswill become
apparent below.
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Figure 5: The Problem of Iterated Update
AGM theory of revision has littleto say in this respect [23, 27]. As a result, a number of proposal for
extendingtheoriesof beliefrevisionto dictaterevised rankingsorepistemicstateshavebeen proposed
[31,5,9,32,11]. In fact,it isthe“revisioncomponent”ofGU(as opposedtothe“updatecomponent”)
that fails to adequately characterize the required change in epistemicstate. This can be seen clearly in
Figure 5: the model of the system dynamics allows one to update the entire ranking, while the revi-
sion of the updated ranking simply produces a belief set. Thus, a reasonable theory of belief revision,
that speciﬁes how one should revise an epistemic state, will automatically dictate how to apply GU to
epistemic states.
We will describeseveral methods of effecting iterated revision (and, in particular, revisionof epis-
temic states)withintheGUframework below. In particular, two models ofiterated revision withinthe
theory of
 -rankings, as developed by Spohn [31] (and further investigated by Goldszmidt and Pearl
[18, 19]), can be applied almost directly to GU. However, the application of these techniques to GU
can be better motivated by illustrating the connections of GU to stochastic dynamical systems, which
we do in the next section. We note that in a purely qualitative setting (with a relation
  of relative
plausibilityreplacing a ranking function
 ), iterated revision is especially problematic.12 However, at
one of the models developed below can be applied in such a setting.
Before proceeding with our account of iterated GU, we pause to reﬂect on the new light shed on
12For a discussionof some of the difﬁculties, see [23, 9, 7, 11].
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Figure 6: Iterated Revision with (a) Static and (b) Inert GU Models
Theorem 4.5,therelationshipofGUandbeliefrevision,by thisviewofiterated revision. Theorem4.5
shows that if our GU-model is static (i.e., if the null event is the only plausible event), then GU will
satisfy the eight AGM postulates for belief revision. The intuitionsunderlying such static models are
clear, and are illustrated graphically in Figure 6(a): the update portion of GU leaves the ranking unal-
tered, thus allowing the revision component to proceed on the original ranking.
However,becauseoftheweaknessoftheAGMpostulates,theconditionsofTheorem4.5aremuch
stronger than necessary. For example, suppose we have an inert model, one where the null event is
more plausiblethan other events (see Figure 6(b)). In such a model, other events can occur, but some
“preference” is given to explanationsof observations that require no changes in the world. Due to the
fact that the AGM theory doesn’t imposestrong restrictions on the form of updated rankings, we have
the following result:
Proposition 5.1 If
  is induced by an inert GU model then
  satisﬁes (R1)–(R8).
Intuitively,theonly requirement of theAGM postulatesis that theagent’s epistemic stateis character-
ized by some rankingin which worldsconsistentwithits beliefs form theset of most plausibleworlds.
In Figure 6(b) we can see that the update portion of GU preserves the agent’s belief state, just like a
static model. This means that the revision portion of GU will satisfy the AGM postulateswith respect
to theoriginalbeliefstate. Unfortunately,theinert model,unlikethestaticmodel, can shifttherelative
plausibility of all worlds other than those with rank 0. This means that generalized update by an ob-
25servation that is not consistentwith the agent’s originalbelief set does not generally produce the same
belief set that would be obtained by straightforward revision with respect to the original ranking.
Although the AGM postulates are satisﬁed, we should not consider “inert generalized update” to
be the “special case” of GU corresponding to revision. Since the model is not truly static, one can
produce truly bizarre results that we would not expect of belief revision. For instance, given an initial
belief set
K, it is quite possible with an inert model that
K
 
A is very different from
 
K
 
 
 
 
A. In other
words, updating by a null observation followed by
A can result in a different belief set than updating
immediately by
A. This is, of course, not surprising, given that the world can change. It is, however,
surprising that it should satisfy the AGM postulates if these postulates are intended to characterize
revision in static environments. Again, we emphasize that this is due to the fact that the AGM theory
says nothing substantial about iterated revision or the revision of epistemic states.
We note that recent proposals for dealing with iterated revision (e.g., see Boutilier’s MC-revision
model [9], or the postulates of Darwiche and Pearl [11]) all insist that revision by
  not affect the
agent’s epistemic state. It is clear that an inert model does not satisfy this requirement. However,
static models do. Thus we legitimize the claim that, in fact, static GU models exactly capture the in-
tuitions underlying belief revision, and formally verify the conventional wisdom that belief revision
corresponds to belief change about static environments.
5.2 Stochastic Dynamical Systems and GU
Webeginwithaverybriefdescriptionofasimplemodelofapartiallyobservable,stochasticdynamical
system.13 As above, a system can be in a number of possiblestates
S.14 The system dynamics can be
characterized by two families of probabilitiesfunctions. Event probabilitiesrefer to the probabilityof
a particular event occurring at a given state:
P
r
 
e
j
s
  refers to the probability of
e occurring in state
s.15 Outcome probabilitiescapture the probability of a particularstate
t resulting from the occurrence
of an event
e at state
s, and are denoted
P
r
 
t
j
s
 
e
 .
An agent’s epistemic state is represented by a distributionover states,
P
r
k
 
s
  denotingthe agent’s
degree of belief that the system is in state
s at time
k. The agent can update its distribution using its
13The interested reader can consult [25, 10, 3, 30, 24] for more detailed models, discussionsof control, etc.
14We will use the term “state” in the context of stochasticdynamical systems, and “world” when discussingGU.
15Technically,
P
r
 
e
j
s
  is not a conditional probability, but a distribution over
E as a function of
s,
P
r
s
 
e
 . We use this
notation for its suggestivenessand familiarity. (Similarly for
P
r
 
t
j
s
 
e
  deﬁnedbelow.)
26model of the dynamics as follows:
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This corresponds to the agent’s predications about how the system will evolve in one “clock tick.”
In orderto accountforobservationstheagentmight makeofthesystemstate, weassumean obser-
vation model: we have a set of possibleobservations
O togetherwitha family of distributions
P
r
 
o
j
s
 
representing the probability of making an observation
o
 
O when the true system state is
s.16 When
an agent makes an observation
o at time
k
 
 , we can view the change of its epistemic state as a
two-stage process: ﬁrst, it updates its distribution to form
P
r
k
 
  as above; second, it conditions this
distributionon the observation
o to obtain
P
r
o
k
 
 . This second phase can be computed using a simple
application of Bayes Rule:
P
r
o
k
 
 
 
s
 
 
P
r
 
o
j
s
 
P
r
k
 
 
 
s
 
P
t
P
r
 
o
j
t
 
P
r
k
 
 
 
t
 
(4)
WenowturnourattentiontotherelationshipbetweenGUandthismodelofbeliefupdateinstochas-
tic dynamical systems. We ﬁrst note that straightforward predictiveupdate, the updatingof a ranking,
follows exactly the same “rules” as the update of a probability distribution, the distinction being that
qualitativeprobabilities(“kappas”)areusedinGU.In particular,Equation2 ispreciselythequalitative
analog of Equation 3.
Accounting for observations is not quite so straightforward. The assumption underlying all work
in beliefrevision and update,includingthe GUmodel as presented, is that the agent observes proposi-
tions directly. Unlikethe standard dynamical system model, observationsare actually part of the state
(i.e., apropositionthatisdeterminedbythestate). Thismakesitdifﬁculttodealwithfallibleor“noisy”
observations (though not impossible—see the next section). In order to account for such determinis-
tic observations, we will specialize the dynamical system model by assuming that each state dictates
precisely the observation that will be made. In other words, we assume that
P
r
 
o
j
s
 
 
  if
s
j
 
o and
P
r
 
o
j
s
 
 
  if
s
 
j
 
o. In order to make sense of this, we must consider the proposition or variable
that the agent is attemptingto observe, otherwisethere is no reason theagent cannot observethe entire
state. Therefore, we make a tacit assumption that an agent explicitly acts to observe the truth value of
a particular proposition. This action does not change the world in any way (it is a null event), but tells
16In more generalmodels,onecanallow the observationto dependonstate transitionsor on the actiontakenbythe agent.
Such complications are not germane to the discussionhere.
27the agent whether the propositionis true or false.17 We will relax the assumption that this observation
process is infalliblein the next section.
With this deterministic observation model in hand, we note that updating by Bayes Rule in Equa-
tion 4 simpliﬁes to simple conditioningby the observation
o. In other words,
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(5)
Generalized update can be used to produce a new
 -ranking by conditioningin an entirely analogous
way. Recall that
 
  refers to theupdated rankingbefore revisionby the operation(as deﬁned by Equa-
tion 2). We deﬁne
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w
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(6)
This process ofconditioning(in a staticcontext)is described in [19]. Intuitively,theagent’s initial
rankingisupdated,thentheobservation
Aisappliedtotheupdatedrankingbyremovingall
 
A-worlds
(the remaining worlds are normalized by subtracting
 
 
 
A
  so that a legitimate ranking results). We
dub this process infallible GU because all observations are treated as being certain. The process of
infallible GU naturally lends itself to iteration, since generalized update by an observation
A results
in an updated ranking. The result of infallibleupdate by the observationWet(G) in the rain example is
illustratedinFigure7. Wenotethatconditioningis an especiallysimpleformofupdatingan epistemic
state in response to an observation. It can be be applied directly to purely qualitative ranking in the
obvious way.
5.3 Noisy Observations in GU
The key difﬁculty with the infallible model of GU, in other words, conditioning directly on observed
propositions, is the assumption that propositions in the domain are directly observable without error.
For instance, given the infallible update by Wet(G) in the previous example, an agent cannot subse-
quently meaningfully update his epistemic state by the observation Dry(G) unless there is an explain-
ing event that immediately causes the grass to dry. In no way will an explanation of Dry(G) include
the possibilitythat the earlier observation was incorrect.
17Such actions might take the form of Scherl and Levesque’s[28] sense
P actions. This action returns an observation of
the form
P or
 
P for a particular proposition
P. This is the sense in which states “determine” observations (relative to a
given sensingaction).
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Figure 7: Conditioning and Infallible Generalized Update
Onecandealwiththisdifﬁcultyinaratherobviousway: simplyaddpropositionstothedomainthat
refer totheobservationsthathavebeen orcanbemade bytheagent. Thefact thatan observationofthe
propositionWet(G) isfalliblecan bemodeled by relatingtheconditionaldegreeof beliefa proposition
describing the observation (say obsWetG) to the proposition itself. For instance, an agent’s epistemic
state might reﬂect the fact that any state in which Wet(G)
  obsWetG holds is more plausible than the
corresponding world satisfying Wet(G)
  obsDryG (e.g., by some amount
 
 obsDryG
jWet(G)
 ). In
this sense, while conditioningby the observation obsWetG does preclude the fact that you might have
made observation obsDryG, it does not rule out the possibility Dry(G); it merely makes it less plau-
sible. Of course, in order to fully develop this model of conditioning by observations, we would be
forced to deal with time in some way or another. For example, conditioningon obsWetGrules out any
worlds in which obsDryGis true. However, one could subsequentlymake a contradictory observation
of dry grass. In order to condition on this new observation, we would require a different (but related)
propositionthatrefers toobsDryGatthenextpointintime.18 Wecould,forinstance,usetime-stamped
observational propositions. In order to specify such a model in a convenient way, we would have to
develop additionalmachinery. We do not pursuethis here, thoughit could be developedin a less awk-
ward fashion in the run-based model of Friedman and Halpern [12] (which is described below).
Instead, we will present a second alternative, based directly on standard stochastic observation
18A distinct observational proposition is necessary, since conditioning on obsWetG removes all worlds where obsDryG
holds. Subsequentconditioning on obsDryGwould result in inconsistentbeliefs.
29models. We assume that there exists a set of observations
O that are related in a nondeterministicway
to possible worlds. The observation model
  describes the plausibilityof various observations in dif-
ferent world states. Formally,
 
 
W
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N
  maps worlds into
 -rankings over the observation
set. Theranking
 
 
w
 describeshowlikelytheagent isto observeagiven
o
 
O in world
w. We write
 
 
o
j
w
  for
 
 
w
 
 
o
 . As usual, for each
w, there is at least one
o such that
 
 
o
j
w
 
 
 .
Once again, we do not assume that an observation is dictated solely by the true state of the world,
but is inﬂuenced by the observation action taken by the agent. For instance, if the agent executes an
“observe grass” action, the appropriate observation set might be
fobsWetG
 obsDryG
g, and the ob-
servation model might be speciﬁed as follows:
 
 obsWetG
jWet(G)
 
 
 ;
 
 obsDryG
jWet(G)
 
 
 ;
 
 obsWetG
jDry(G)
 
 
 ;
 
 obsDryG
jDry(G)
 
 
 .19 To keep the presentation a bit simpler, we
suppress any conditioning of observation models on the observational action being taken, especially
since this impacts littleon the development (and the extension is obvious). We simply assume that an
appropriate observation is (actively or passively)obtained by some means.
With this model of “fallible” observations, we can extend GU to a form of fallible generalized
updatemuch as wedid to obtaininfallibleGU.To do thiswe willusetheanalog ofEquation4 directly
(recall, that in the infallible/conditioning case, this application of Bayes Rule reduced to the simpler
formgivenbyEquation5). Recallthat
 
 refers totheupdatedrankingbeforerevisionbytheoperation
(as deﬁned by Equation 2). We deﬁne, for any observation
A:
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w
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w
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  (7)
We note that the last term reﬂects the absoluteplausibilityof making observation
A and is deﬁned as:
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Intuitively, this model does precisely what one expects: given an observation
A, each world be-
comes more or less plausible according to the degree to which it gives rise to
A. Worlds for which
A is expected (
 
 
A
j
w
 
 
 ) keep the same relative rank, while worlds for which
A is unexpected
(
 
 
A
j
w
 
 
k
 
 ) become less plausible by the degree
k to which
A was surprising. Finally, the
normalization term
 
 
A
  is subtracted to ensure that an appropriate ranking (with minimal elements
having rank 0) is obtained. We note that if observations are deterministic, or embedded in the world
19This method of speciﬁcation summarizes the observation model; e.g.,
 
 obsWetG
jWet(G)
 
 
  means that
 
 obsWetG
j
w
 
 
  for all
w
j
  Wet(G).
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Figure 8: Uncertain Observations and Fallible Generalized Update
statedescription,thenEquation7 reduces exactlytoEquation6 and isnothingmore thanconditioning.
To illustratethe process, consider the litmus example of Figure 4. Now imagine that observations
of color are imperfect, so that false readings are implausibleto degree 2; that is,
 
 obsColor1
jColor2
 
is 0 if thetruecolorand observed colorare thesame, and is 2 ifthey are different. The resultoffallible
update by the observation obsGreen given this observation model is illustrated in Figure 8
We note that this model of noisy observations cannot be used, at least in its full generality, in a
purely qualitativesetting(thoughseeremarks inSection7). Akey elementoftheobservationmodel is
theabilitytospecifythatcertainobservationsoccurwithvaryingdegrees ofplausibility,and theability
to compare (and combine) the degrees of plausibilityaccorded to particular worlds by an observation
with their prior degrees of plausibility.
Finally, we point out a third way in which noisy observationscan be incorporated, through theuse
of strength of evidence. In the original development of
 -functions, Spohn [31] does not emphasize
conditioning by observations, but
 -conditioning, where a proposition
A is observed with a certain
(integer) strength
 . Intuitively,the relative plausibilityof all
A-worlds is shifted by
  (so that if
  is
positive,
A becomes more plausible). This process is dubbed
J-conditioning in [19] (as it is exactly
analogous to Jeffrey conditioningof a probabilitydistribution). In [19] a similar process known as
L-
conditioning is also proposed, whereby
A does not become
  degrees more plausible, but
A is made
to plausible to degree
 .
Instead ofhaving an explicitobservationmodel, onecould directlyobservepropositionsin thedo-
main, and account fortheuncertaintyoftheseobservationsby attachingstrengthstothem. In thisway,
31instead of direct conditioning by
A (and its attendant difﬁculties),
J-conditioning or
L-conditioning
may be used. We do not pursue this suggestion here; the reader is referred to [31, 19] for details of
this type of conditioning. The application of these ideas to GU is straightforward. However, a key
question that arises is the following: how does one determine the strength of an observation? The ob-
viousansweris that onemusthavean observationmodel. Forthisreason, weﬁnd themodel offallible
generalized update to be the most compelling of qualitativebelief change in dynamic settings.
6 Related Work
6.1 Trajectory-based Semantics
There are a number of ideas that have directly inﬂuenced the generalized update model, includingthe
workcitedaboveonbeliefrevision,beliefupdate,
 -rankings,iteratedrevision,reasoningaboutaction
and dynamical systems. However, there have been few attempts to tie all of these ideas together in
a comprehensive, qualitative framework. There is one framework in which belief update and belief
revision can both be expressed, namely, the run-based (or trajectory-based) model of Friedman and
Halpern [12]. This model is similar to ours, especially in its general outlook on revision and update
and its adoption of a dynamical systems perspective.
In therun-basedframework, an agent imposesaqualitativeplausibilityrelation(servingtheroleof
a
 -function)notoverpossibleworlds,but onpossiblesystemtrajectoriesorhistories. Each trajectory
corresponds to a sequence of transitions,or states the world might have passed through. The relative
plausibility of a trajectory captures the degree to which an agent thinks that trajectory might be (or
has been) realized. When an observation is made at a particular pointin time, a normal belief revision
process can be applied. Themost plausibletrajectories after revision by a particularobservation make
up the agent’s new belief state. As such, an agent can have beliefs that extend over time. Friedman
and Halpern alsoshowthat undercertain assumptionsbeliefchange in thismodel satisﬁesthe revision
postulates and under certain assumptions satisﬁes the KM update postulates.
One impediment to the use of a trajectory-based model is determining an initial ranking of en-
tire trajectories. While Friedman and Halpern do not emphasize this point, it is clear that the individ-
ual (state-to-state)transitionswithin a trajectory should correspond to the occurrence of events within
the system, and that the (initial)relative plausibilityof a trajectory should simply be a function of the
(prior) plausibility of its initial state and the plausibilities of the individual event occurrences along
the trajectory (together with the plausibility of the corresponding event outcomes). In this respect, it
32is easy to see how GU can be embedded in the Friedman-Halpern model. The distinctions lie in em-
phasis: we focus on thesourceoftrajectory plausibilitiesas a functionof individualevents,actions,or
their outcomes, while Friedman and Halpern emphasize the relative plausibilityof entire trajectories.
Viewed in this light we can also see some of the technical assumptions implicit in the GU model.
First, our observation and system dynamics models treat the plausibility of observations, events and
event/actionoutcomes as a functionof worldstate; theactual historyan agent has passed throughdoes
not inﬂuence the agent’s estimate of action outcome or observation likelihoods. Thus, we are mak-
ing the Markovian assumption: dynamics are independent of history. For this to provide an accurate
model of a domain, our states or worlds must contain enough information to render predictions of the
future independent of the past. This is generally not very restrictive, and is the assumptionunderlying
almost all work in AI on planningand reasoning about action. However, thetrajectory-based model is
moregeneralinthisrespect. Non-MarkoviansystemsareeasilyrepresentableintheFriedman-Halpern
model. Furthermore, we have made an assumption of stationarity: the system dynamics and observa-
tion model do not change over time. Again, while this assumption is relatively uncontroversial, the
Friedman-Halpern model can very easily deal with nonstationary systems.
We note that in subsequent work [14], Friedman and Halpern address the difﬁculty of associating
plausibility with entire trajectories and come to precisely the same conclusions: the Markovian and
stationarity assumptions are very natural and provide great leverage in specifying system dynamics
(and for their model, easily allow one to determine the plausibility of trajectories). The assumptions
that frameworks for qualitative belief change, like GU and the Friedman-Halpern system, show to be
effective in modeling beliefchange are exactly thosethat havebeen adopted in the dynamical systems
community for years. Finally, we note that Geffner [16] has recently developed a model for reasoning
aboutactionusingthe
 -calculustorepresentthedefeasibilityofactioneffects. By makingtheMarkov
assumption explicit, he uses this model to determine the plausibilityof system trajectories.
To illustrate the power of GU (as well as the implications of assumptions such as Markovian dy-
namics), we consider the stolen or borrowed car problem.20 The setting is as follows: you arrive at a
very expensiverestaurant, and leave yourvery expensivecar withthevalet to be parked. At theend of
the evening you pick up your car from the parking lot and begin to drivehome. A few miles later, you
notice that the odometer reading is extremely high (say 50 miles higher than when you arrived at the
restaurant; it’s a very expensive car and you are obsessive about the mileage!). How will your belief
20The borrowedcar problem is developed by Friedman and Halpern in their trajectory-based model, but the example is
attributed to the author. The related stolen car problem is due to Kautz [22].
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Figure 9: The Borrowed or Stolen Car Problem
state change?
Intuitively,what weare afterinthisexampleis theexplanationthat thevalet tookyourcar outfora
joyridewhileyou were eating. To seehowthismight arise, we consideran event model in whichthere
are several possibleevents, includingthe null event (where your car stays put), the steal event (where
yourcar isstolenfrom thelot),and thejoyrideevent (whereyourcar isborrowed bythevalet forsome
period of time). Furthermore, we might have some estimate of the length of time for which the valet
might borrowthecar, whichcould bemodeled usingareturnevent (thevalet returnsthecar to thelot).
One possible event model is illustrated in Figure 9, along with an initial belief state in which you are
certain the car is in the lot with low mileage.
We consider several possible observations and updates of epistemic state one could make. Sup-
pose at time 1 you unexpectedly return to the parking lot to pick up the car and ﬁnd it missing. The
most plausibleexplanation is the steal event, and you will believe the car has been stolen (as well, the
mileage is high). If you make no such observation at time 1 (e.g., any observation actions taken—see
Section 5.2 and 5.3—were unrelated to these propositions), then any of the models of GU that deal
with iteration (as presented in Section 5) will leave you in the epistemic state (and associated belief
state) given by the ranking at time 1.
34Supposeyoutry topick up thecar at time2 and ﬁnd thecar missing(that is, not parked). The most
plausible explanation is that the car was stolen (but note there is no preference as to when the car was
stolen, at time 0 or time 1). If the car is still in the lot, and you observe Parked, you will assume that
nothing strange has happened. Should you also observe that the mileage is High at time 2, then you
have no choice but to conclude that the car was joyridden and returned.21
Suppose,now,thatafterreturningattime2toﬁndthecarparked(butnotyetobservingthemileage),
you begin to drive home and notice High halfway home, at time 3. Your belief at time 2 that nothing
unusual happened is now revised: again you must believe that the car was joyridden at time 0 at re-
turned attime1. Notethatthisevent modelassertsthatifacaris beingjoyridden,themostlikelyevent
is the return of the car, with a continuationof the ride being unlikely. If you had found the car missing
at time 2, and for some reason were convinced that it wasn’t stolen, the most plausible explanation
would be that it was joyriddenat time 1, not at time 0: had it been taken at time 0, it wouldmost likely
have been returned by now. Thus, unlikethe explanations of a stolen car (where no preference for the
time of stealingis given),the joyrideexplanationcomes witha preference for a more recent ride. This
is due solely to the fact that our model of the process implicitly provides a duration. Should continue
be just as likely as return, this chronological preference would disappear.
It is worthwhile to point out some of the demands made by the Markov and stationarity assump-
tions in an example like this. Note that we have added propositions like joyridden and stolen to the
description of the world. In a certain sense, these propositions encode the history of past events. As
such, we don’t need to keep track of history explicitly,but only the relevant bits of historythat we de-
cide to represent in our propositional language. This makes a model based on epistemic states about
the “current” state of affairs more attractive than a trajectory-based model: history can be accounted
for, but one has the option of distinguishing only relevant historical facts as opposed to considering
arbitrary distinctionsbetween entire trajectories.
6.2 Distance-based Semantics
Recently, a model of belief revision based on a distance semantics was proposed [29]. Roughly, we
assume the existence of a metric
d over
W that speciﬁes the “distance” between possible worlds. In-
tuitively,
d
 
w
 
v
  reﬂects the degree of difﬁculty or cost to change from situation
w to
v. One key
assumption is that
d
 
w
 
v
 is minimum exactly when
w
 
v. Given a belief set
K, and an observation
21To keep the diagram simple, we have “folded in” the effect of the “return to pick up car” action with the effects of the
other actions (e.g., it causesInCar to hold if the car is present).
35A, those
A-worlds closest (according to
d) to some element of
k
K
k determine the set
K
 
A. Since
d is
ﬁxed, this model allows for iteration as well.
It is shown in [29] that, under certain assumptions, such a semantics is equivalent to the AGM
model of revision (that is, it satisﬁes the AGM postulates, and can represent any operator that satis-
ﬁes the postulates). In one sense, this result may seem surprising, for the intuitions underlying the
semantics are much like that of update semantics. Indeed, we might view the basic GU semantics as
providingadistancemetricthat can be usedin thisregard: wecan take
d
 
w
 
v
 to betheplausibilityof
the most plausibletransitionfrom
w to
v. Under the assumption of inertness described in Section 5.1,
we can see that
d
 
w
 
w
 (for any
w) is minimum. Of course, it was just this inertness assumption that
allowed us to show that GU satisﬁed the AGM postulates (Proposition 5.1). However, as we argued
there, thisassumptionis not thecorrect way to thinkaboutbeliefrevision(as opposedto update). That
it satisﬁes the AGM postulates is a sign of the weakness of these postulates, not of the suitability of
inert models as a semantics for revision. As a result, the fact that a distance semantics can be made
to satisfy the postulates does not mean revision can be thought of productively in these terms. We do
note that distances do play a role in belief update however; we can view the relative plausibility of
transitions as a form of distance between worlds.22
7 Concluding Remarks
We have provided a model for generalized belief update that extends both the classical update and re-
vision models, combining the crucial aspects of both, and retaining both as special cases. The main
feature of GU is its insistence one be allowed to both revise and update one’s beliefs about the world
in response to an observation. In addition, we have provided an abductive interpretation of update as
the process of explaining observations in terms of what was initially true, what event or action may
have occurred and theoutcome that event may have had. We presented a model for dealing with noisy
observations in belief revision, treating a problem that has been virtually ignored in the belief revi-
sion and reasoningabout actioncommunities. Finally,wehave shownthestrongconnectionsbetween
the GU model (especially as augmented with observation models) and the well-understood models of
stochastic dynamical systems. Indeed, GU can be viewed as a qualitative form of Bayesian update,
with the
 -calculus playing the role of probabilisticlaws.
In this paper, we have focused exclusively on the semantics of generalized update. Appropriate
22Distancesof this type are, however, not generally symmetric.
36representation languages for the concise expression of events (with defeasible effects), defeasible be-
liefs and other aspects of the model must still be developed. The speciﬁcation language proposed by
Geffner [16] would seem to be a useful way of representing the system dynamics component of a GU
model. Many of the othercomponents of such languagesare already in place, based primarily on con-
ditional and dynamic logics, and other languages for actions and defeasible beliefs. However, a num-
ber of details regarding compact and natural representation languages and their feasibility are sure to
require some subtlety. This undertaking is especially important when the ability to reason about in-
completely speciﬁed systems is required.
One issue that has remained unexplored to a large extent is that of revising beliefs about system
dynamics (event and outcome plausibilities). The GU model supposes that events and outcomes are
speciﬁed independentlyof an agent’sbeliefs, and that the dynamics ofthe systemin questionare ﬁxed
and known. The same holds true for an agent’s observation model. In general, however, one might
expect an agent to have beliefs about these entities which are themselves subject to revision. While
not inconsistent with our model, a more elaborate treatment requires a language in which (defeasible)
beliefs about events, outcomes, and so on can be expressed.
One ﬁnal stumbling block to a general treatment of qualitativebelief change has to do with purely
ranked models in which
 -like ranking information is not available. The
  values of different worlds
and events provided us with a direct means of determining (for instance) the relative plausibility of
various transitions by permitting the addition of the component
 s. Models based on pure ranking
information, without quantitativedegrees of belief, are often used in belief revision (see, for instance,
the semantics for AGM revision given in [20, 6] or the plausibility measures of [13]). To compare
the relative plausibility of transitions in such a setting, we must have a way of trading off the relative
likelihoods of initial conditions, events, event outcomes, and so forth. Simple ranking information
does not allowone to do so; direct judgementsof theplausibilityofthese combinationsmust be made.
A more general qualitative theory would do just that—an example of such a theory is the plausibility
measure approach recently proposed in [14]. The
 -approach presented here is a special case of this
more general model. However, theessentialspiritof such aproposalis identicalto that underlyingour
presentation.
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Proposition 4.1 If
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